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I want to talk about where the economy  is, and what the impli-
cations  are  for the outlook,  given certain  policy assumptions.
Then I want to talk about inflation within the macro-policy,  the
broad  monetary  and fiscal policy,  considerations.  Also  I think  the
micro  considerations  are  all too  frequently  overlooked  or  consid-
ered  unimportant.  I  am  really  thinking  in terms  of the  economic
structure  and  those  policy  determinations  which  relate  to  the
economic  structure.
And  finally,  I  want  to  talk  about  inflation  and  the  need  for
international  cooperation  if inflation  is  ever to  be successfully  re-
solved.  Actions  far  beyond  those  which  we  can  bring  to  bear
domestically will be required  to purge the world of inflation  so that
we can  begin  to plan with  any semblance  of logic for better living
conditions  in  the future.
In his economic  address to the nation President  Ford said with
rather  simple  eloquence  that the state of the  nation was good,  but
the  state of the economy was not so good. That statement sums up
a great deal.
Where  are  we  right now?  In  the first  quarter of this  year  the
economy  declined  at  an  annual  rate  of roughly  7  percent  in  real
terms.  In the second quarter the rate of decline dropped to under 2
percent,  at an annual rate,  in terms of real output. Whether we call
it a recession  or not, the economy is not in good shape.  I think that
a recession  will be  at least  as deep  as the  one we  experienced  in
1969 and  1970.
Any  recovery in the durables sector,  which is principally  being
led now  by a revival of automobile  sales,  is  largely illusory.  Real
purchasing power continues to suffer as a consequence of inflation.
Income  growth,  in  nominal  terms,  still  remains  quite  slow.  Since
we  are  now  anticipating  an  increase  of at  least  $450  to  $500  in
average  per  unit price  of new automobiles  in  1975,  the  recent  im-
provement  in  durable  goods  sales,  particularly  automobiles,  is  at
the expense  of the  1975  model year.  I do not think that we can take
any great solace from the fact that Americans  have concluded that
the  1974 automobiles  represent a better buy. Belatedly the industry
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streets the price differential,  on the average  from the  1973's,  will be
$1,000,  and in many instances far more than that. The real income
of consumers will be substantially lower than it was two years ago.
Under  these  circumstances  it  is  rather  difficult  to  forecast  any
appreciable  improvement  in  this component  of durable  goods.
Consumer spending  on other durable  goods,  such  as furniture
and  appliances,  is  also  likely  to  slacken  because  of the  related
weakness  in the housing market.  There  is very little  prospect that
we  are  going  to  see  any  appreciable  improvement  in  consumer
spending  for durable  goods.  Quite frankly,  we  will probably  see  a
further deterioration  from  current  levels for the remainder of this
year.
Now,  turning to the investment  sector, we find  some very seri-
ous questions.  The housing industry is not concerned with defining
a  recession;  by  any  definition  it  is  in  a  pronounced  depression.
Housing starts  in July were running at an annual  rate of little more
than  1.3  million  units.  This  is  about  half  of the  number  a  year
earlier.  Housing  permits,  which  offer some  advance  indication of
what activity  levels  are  likely to  be  some  months  down  the  line,
were  roughly  40  to  50 percent  behind  a year earlier.  We  may  yet
see  a further drop  in  housing starts  to  an annual rate  of perhaps  a
million  units by  year end.  Housing  starts for the year as a  whole
will probably average  under  1.5  million units. Last year they aver-
aged  2.1  million.
This  situation,  of course,  is  a consequence  of a variety  of fac-
tors,  especially the incredible  increase  in  the median  price of new
housing.  In four years the median price of a new house has risen 50
percent.  The median  single unit dwelling price in America today  is
about  $35,000.  And  if  anyone  is  looking  for  something  under
$20,000  to $25,000,  chances  are  nine out  of ten that  he  is going to
have  to  settle  for a  mobile  home.  We  no  longer build,  to  any ap-
preciable  degree,  the  kind  of houses  that  used  to  represent  for
many  the  culmination  of the  American  dream-one's  own  single
family  home.  As  we  look  around  at  the  garden  apartments  and
condominiums  we may,  in fact,  be seeing the shape of future  resi-
dential  dwellings  in  America.
Construction  costs  have  been  rising  tremendously.  Interest
costs  and  mortgage  costs  have  also  been  rising.  For  all  practical
purposes, unless  sellers of existing houses are willing to pay a very
substantial  penalty  in points, they are just not going to find people
in  a  position  to  deal  for their  houses.  So the  housing  situation  is
4grim  and  is likely to get grimmer irrespective  of anything the Fed-
eral Reserve  System does.
In terms  of capital  investment,  planned  expenditures  for  1974
will now be about  12.5 percent larger than for 1973. This represents
a modest revision from the earlier surveys.  We  have to remember
that capital investment  is  a lagging  indicator;  it tends  to  peak  out
and turn down well after the economy has itself turned down.  It is
conceivable  that despite what  still looks to be substantial  strength
in this area, we are going to see some weakening from these antici-
pated  figures.
The  most important  consideration  that poses  potential trouble
for the American  economy  is  inventories.  Almost every business
cycle  can  be  construed  as  an  inventory  cycle.  Since  inventory
adjustments  lag behind changes  in  sales,  at some  point  inventory
has to be adjusted  downward just when the economy  is quite soft.
This simply compounds the situation and turns  a flat economy into
a declining  economy.
We thought that inventory accumulation for the first three quar-
ters of last year was proceeding  at roughly an  annual  rate of $4.5
billion. Then with the onset of the October war in the Mideast,  the
oil  embargo,  the  public  attitude  against  purchases  of  large  au-
tomobiles,  which  contributed  very  substantially  to  buildups,  the
rate  of  accumulation  jumped  from  the  presumed  $4.5  billion  to
$18.5  billion,  or rougly  fourfold.  We  explained this  in  part  by the
automobile  situation, which  led  many people  to conclude  that the
only  problem  the economy  was  suffering  was  an energy-induced
problem.  Harry  Dent,  the  Secretary  of Commerce,  said,  "The
American  situation now is not a recession;  it's  an energy-induced
spasm."
In fact,  our problems were  not stemming  wholly from energy;
they were simply being compounded by it. But many people looked
at what  happened  to  automobiles  and  said,  "Well,  that  accounts
for  the  inventory  situation."  But,  when  the  second  quarter  pre-
liminary gross  national product  (GNP) figures  were released  with
revisions  for previous periods,  they  showed that for the first  nine
months of 1973,  instead of averaging a $4.5 billion accumulation,  it
averaged  $10  billion.  And the fourth  quarter figure  was not  $18.5
billion but $28.5 billion.  Meanwhile the growth  in real output of the
economy  dropped from 9 percent in the first quarter to 1 percent  in
the fourth.
By the first half of 1974 we had already undergone a substantial
inventory  adjustment,  which  in part contributed to  the big drop  in
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accumulating  at an annual rate of about $15  billion.  So we have cut
the  rate of accumulation  by  half.
As I look to the future, the weakness  in consumer durables, the
weakness  in  housing,  the  potential  weakness  in  capital  outlets,
suggest weakened demand. Then the implications of this inventory
outlook become  potentially very bothersome,  particularly when we
consider  that  the  mechanics  of accounting  for business  sales  and
accounting  for  inventories  are  quite  different.  Business  sales,
which for the first time  in four years declined  in July, are  valued in
GNP  accounts  at  current  market  prices.  Inventories  are  deter-
mined  by  their  book  value.  This  means  that  there  is  a  built-in
tendency  in  a  period  of rising  prices  to  understate  the  physical
volume of stocks on hand.  And, to the extent that we are expecting
substantial  inflation  in  the future  combined  with  a likelihood  of a
further deterioration  in final sales, inventories  could be a very seri-
ous damaging  and  depressing factor in  the outlook.
Turning to government spending,  when we take into considera-
tion  the  receipt  of revenue-sharing  funds  plus  federal,  state,  and
local  government  spending,  these  governmental  units  combined
will  probably  be  running  a  small  surplus.  In  terms  of the  total
impact of government spending on the economy, this small surplus
is  going  to  be  somewhat  restrictive.  Surpluses  tend to  be restric-
tive,  even  as  deficits  are  stimulative.  There  will  be  increases  in
state and local government  spending.  But because of present capi-
tal  and money market  conditions  and interest rate constraints,  we
are going to be seeing more than the normal amount of deferrals  at
state  and local  government  levels,  in  terms of capital  projects.
There  is a  strong push  to cut or at  least limit  federal  expendi-
tures  for the remainder  of this fiscal year as well as  the fiscal  year
beginning July  1,  1975.  President  Ford  has  indicated  he  hopes to
cut federal  spending from the projected  $305  billion to $300 billion.
There  is  some question  whether this  can  be done.  There  is  some
question  in  my  mind  whether  the  reduction  will  even  be  appro-
priate.  But the  thrust  of government  spending  is  at this  moment
biased  a bit toward  restraint rather than  stimulus.
What  does  this  suggest  for the  outlook?  It  suggests  that  real
activity levels are likely to decline further for the remainder of 1974
and perhaps into early  1975.  We  can only hope for very modest, if
any, increases  in real  economic  growth beginning in mid-1975.  We
are  likely  to  see  a  continuation  of the  rising  trend  in  unemploy-
ment.  By  1975  I would expect it to  exceed  6 percent.
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economic  slack  and  rising  unemployment,  the  response  in  times
past  has  been  quite  clear.  Fiscal  policy  has  moved  toward
stimulus,  and monetary  policy  has  moved  toward  easing.  That is
the kind of policy  prescription that  would be called for if the  only
consideration  were  the economic outlook  I have described.
But,  as you  know, these  are not normal times.  With  prospects
for the economy  as grim as I have described,  we have to superim-
pose on this the equally grim prospects for price  inflation.  We may
still be seeing rates of inflation as measured by the GNP deflator of
at  least  8 to  9  percent  by  year end.  Price  inflation  in  the  second
quarter of this year,  at an annual  rate, was 9.6 percent,  down from
a little more than  12 percent in the first quarter.  I will take issue at
this  point  with  the  expectation  that  we  can  bring  inflation  to  its
knees by July 4,  1976.  The best I can hope for is that the process of
returning this economy  to some  modicum of stable prices might be
under way by  year end and that it will continue through  1975  into
1976.  I  have  no  expectations  whatsoever  that  we  will  see  an
inflation-free economy by July 4,  1976, unless we are willing to pay
a much higher price  in terms of recession  and slack than any of us
is  prepared to  pay.
We  are  faced  with  a dilemma.  The  economic  situation  clearly
calls  for one  set  of policy  prescriptions,  while  the price  situation
clearly calls for something else.  It is in this regard that  I think  the
micro-economic  or  micro-policy  considerations  are  most  impor-
tant.
It  is  disturbing  to me  that  in  any  analysis  of today's  inflation
combined  with  today's recession,  we find almost a total exclusion
of considerations  of economic  structure  in the  United States.  We
find instead allusions to crop shortages, fertilizer shortages, energy
crises,  and the like.  The incredibly  strong worldwide  demand  last
year contributed to inflation,  by  kicking up the prices of raw mate-
rials.  The energy crisis, which  resulted in tripling and quadrupling
of the  price  of crude  oil,  has  accelerated  inflation.  These  other
considerations  such  as  crop  shortages  have  contributed  to  infla-
tion.  But  in  1969  and  1970  we  experienced  a  recession  with
accelerated  inflation,  and in  1974  we  are  again experiencing  a  re-
cession  with  accelerated  inflation,  which  is  being  aggravated  but
not  wholly  caused,  by  those  factors  which  I  have  mentioned.
There  is  something  about  the  American  economy  that  does  not
seem to work  like it used to.
First, however,  I want to talk about the macro-policy consider-
ations. These  are  important.  But,  in a sense,  they are constrained
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to manage  an economy  in terms of increasing  aggregate  economic
activity.  That is a cinch! The  fact is,  Keynes  said something quite
profound  and quite  simple  when  he  said that  spending creates  in-
come.  It is as simple as that!  Spending  is what creates income,  and
an absence of spending will deteriorate  income.  If we want to hypo
an economy up,  all we have to do is pump  something into it and get
people  to  spend.  On  the monetary  policy  side,  it  means  making
money  and  credit  more  readily  available.  On  the  fiscal  side,  it
means either cutting taxes or increasing expenditures.  Anything to
increase  aggregate  demand  will ultimately  increase  income.
On the other hand, we have learned a lesson,  which I hope  will
cause economists  to have a greater degree of humility,  and that is,
it is not so easy to turn an economy off when  it gets to going at an
excessive  pace.  That is the lesson  that  should  have been  learned,
but  was  not learned.  And  it  is  in  that  regard  that  the  constraints
upon the  ability of monetary  and fiscal  policy to do their job hinge
so  much  on  micro-policy  considerations.  If,  in  fact,  we  can  in-
crease  aggregate demand to increase real output, we can,  theoreti-
cally,  induce  more  slack  in  the  labor and  product  markets  to  get
price and wage  pressures down. That is assuming that all inflation
is a demand  phenomenon  and  is caused by excess  demand.
If that were the case,  we would  have no problems.  The  fact is
we  are  learning  that  inflation  is  not  wholly  a  demand  induced
phenomenon. There are  supply constraints  independent of demand
factors,  and  this complicates our  search  for stability.
Public  policy,  whether  it  is  fiscal  or  monetary  policy,  when
construed for stabilization  purposes,  implicitly assumes that those
policy  initiatives  and actions  are going to  work their way  through
the  marketplace  to  product  markets  and  to  labor  markets,  to  re-
move  excess  price  or  cost  pressures.  If the  key  component,  a
well-operating  competitive  product  and  labor  market,  is  absent,
then  it does not matter how hard we push on those policies.  All we
are  going  to  get  is more  unemployment  and  more  slack  and  only
modest  improvement  in  prices  and cost.
That is what prompted  President Nixon in  1971 to undertake an
incomes  policy.  The  reason  was  that  the economy just  was  not
responding  to  normal  policy.  Then  as soon  as  the incomes  policy
was  undertaken,  fiscal  and  monetary  actions  which  excessively
stimulated  the economy  undercut the prospects for relief from the
incomes  policy.
Whatever  the structural  problems  are  in  the  economy,  mone-
8tary  and  fiscal  agencies  still  have  a  responsibility  to  do  the  best
they  can.  And  any  economic  imperfections  do  not relieve  these
agencies from their statutory  responsibility.  The  Federal  Reserve
System  has  a job  to  do,  and  it  is  not  a pleasant job.  The  federal
government has  a job to  do, and it is not  a pleasant job either, for
its restraints  lead to  slack and  increased unemployment.
As we talk about unemployment  as a cost of price stability,  we
are  talking  about  human  beings,  we  are  talking about the  loss  of
dignity that goes with  the loss of employment.  It  is not something
that  we  should  accept  too  lightly.  If public  policies  are  going to
induce unemployment  deliberately,  then public officials have a re-
sponsibility to mitigate  the effects  of unemployment and to spread
the  burden  of  that  unemployment.  Whether  it  means  increased
public  employment  programs,  increased  expenditures  for  man-
power  training,  liberalization  of unemployment  benefits  and  the
like,  this must go together  with  any stabilization  efforts.  We have
to keep in mind that those people who cry hardest for price stability
are  typically  not in  the front ranks of the inflation fighters on that
unemployment  line.
The Federal Reserve System,  as I see it, is clearly constrained.
It cannot do  a lot.  If it turns around from its present  policy stance
and expands  the money  stock  substantially  to  bring interest rates
down in the short run,  it is going to contribute further to the exist-
ing  inflationary  pressures  because  it  is  going to  intensify  demand
pressures  in  some  areas that are already  running  at a pretty  good
clip.
Similarly, this  is not the time for dramatic  fiscal policy actions
designed to cut down inflation.  Fiscal policy can do only a nominal
amount, given the dimensions of the cut being discussed.  I person-
ally would not object to a modest  deficit at the federal government
level.  I think that the economic  situation probably requires it.  It is
over the longer run that we have to be concerned with this procliv-
ity for the federal  government to continue  to  spend  more income
than  it takes  in through  taxes.
The  government's  tendency  to  deficit  spend  only  reflects  the
public's  same  tendency.  The  American  people  have  always  been
told they  can  have  instant  gratification  without  having  to  worry
about paying.  And it is much easier to recommend a tax cut than a
tax  increase.  Name  the  politician  who  will  run for  office  on the
grounds  that  we  have  to  increase  taxes  and  pay  for  our  public
wants and our public demands!  I am not against public wants.  I am
not against public demands.  But I am for somehow matching those
wants  and demands  with  an ability  to pay.  The  American  people
9have  to  be  made  aware  that just  as  private  goods  cost  money,
public goods  cost money too.  In  the  long run,  we  cannot  indulge
ourselves  without  picking  up a  very  large  due  bill  in  the form  of
inflation.
If there  is  very  little  that  can  be  done  in  the way  of dramatic
policy thrusts,  then we  have to  turn our attention to  micro-policy
considerations.  One  question  that  should  be  asked,  and  is  not
asked often enough,  is why or how can an economy simultaneously
experience  a recession  and accelerated  inflation.  The  only way  it
can happen is if market power, whether it be labor market power or
industry  market  power,  has  reached  the  point  where  sellers  of
resources  or  sellers  of goods  and  services  can  to  a  substantial
degree  set their prices  independent of market  considerations.  We
do not  have  to  look much  farther than  the American  automobile
industry  to see  a classic  case.  If any of us were operating  a busi-
ness that was in as bad shape as the auto industry was last year,  we
would not conclude that this was the most  propitious time to  raise
the selling  price.  Quite  the contrary!  Yet now  we  see substantial
increases  in  view.  Why? To protect  profit  margins.
The marketplace is presumed to operate on the assumption that
those  profit  margins  sometimes  get  eroded and  that  actual  profits
may just disappear when  sales disappear.  That is the way the mar-
ket  is  supposed  to  work.  But in  many  instances  it  does not  work
that way.  If we  go to the labor market  side,  we see the same thing
happening,  particularly  with  craft  unions  in  construction.  The
"discipline  of unemployment"  does  not exert  the  same pull  on  a
craft union in construction  as it does on an unorganized area in the
American economy. We have permitted economic concentration  at
the  industrial  level,  and  in many  instances  in the labor market,  to
proceed  to  the  point where  the  kinds of downward  price and  cost
flexibility  that  were  assumed to  exist  in the  competitive  model  no
longer  can  do  their jobs  at  present  levels  of slack.  If  we  want
downward  price and cost flexibility,  we are going to have to accept
a lot more  slack than we  are  willing to take  right now.
So the matter, then, of a micro-economic policy called antitrust
is something that needs renewed  attention.  We  should begin to ask
ourselves the hard questions of whether or not the public interest is
well  served by the industrial structure  and the labor market  struc-
ture  which  presently  confront  the  American  public.  I  will  say,
categorically,  the answer  is  no,  it is  not being  well  served.  If the
world  is  what  John  Galbraith  described,  in  his  New, Industrial
State,  as  one  in  which  we  are  going  to  have  two  clear  planning
components  in  the  economy,  a  government  and  a private  sector,
10then  I say that is not acceptable to me.  If the market forces are not
going to  do the job, then I  am not going to  rely on the good graces
and beneficence  of private entrepreneurs or labor leaders,  no mat-
ter how big they are, to look after my best interests.
I  would  say,  let us  be  honest about  it,  and  instead  of having
something called state capitalism we may as well just take the thing
over and run it in the public interest  and call  it what  it is,  namely,
socialism. And  I say that without any pejorative connotation of the
word-merely  to express  a  simple  reality.  If,  in fact,  Grumman
Aircraft  Corporation  or  Pan  American  World  Airways  cannot
hack  it  in  a competitive  world,  then  I  say  fine.  Do not  bail  them
out.  If we  need  them,  make  them what  we  make  other  segments
that we need that cannot work in a competitive  marketplace.  Make
them part of the United States government and give  the taxpayers
a voice.  At least make  the costs explicit.
There  is  the  matter,  too,  of trade  policy.  Unfortunately,  the
present  economic  situation  is  bringing out  the  worst in  us.  In  an
environment  of floating  exchange  rates,  which  I find to be at  least
acceptable  in a free market  sense,  we are now  looking at a revival
of  mercantilism.  Under  mercantilism,  countries  pursue  beggar-
thy-neighbor policies to raise exports and cut back on imports. We
find ourselves,  instead of looking for relief for the American  con-
sumer in  the  form of lower priced  imports,  talking now about  im-
posing  higher  taxes  and  higher  quotas  and  higher  trade  barriers.
And other countries  are doing  likewise.
The prospect of competitive devaluations in the face of inflation
worldwide  is  a  prospect  that  should  keep  each  of us concerned,
because  that  prospect  carries  with  it  the  danger of  a  substantial
worldwide  decline  in economic  activity  such  as took  place  in  ear-
lier times.
Our own  government,  in  terms  of its  regulatory  agencies  and
policies,  has  also  contributed  very  substantially  to  the  present
inflation.  And there  is something that can  be done at the stroke of
the  President's  pen,  urging  a  substantial  and  comprehensive  ex-
amination  of regulatory  agencies  and their  policies to  see whether
they  are  consistent  with  competitive  markets  and  price  and  cost
relief in the American economy. There  is no reason whatsoever for
a common  carrier that operates  under the regulations  of the  Inter-
state Commerce  Commission to  take one load from New York to
Los Angeles  and be forced to drive that rig back empty as a condi-
tion of a certificate of public convenience  and necessity.  It makes
no sense  in terms of economic  reality.  It certainly  makes no  sense
in terms of an energy crisis.
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these fundamental  considerations  at  the micro-policy  level,  we do
not fall into the trap of concluding that the only thing that can save
us  is  controls.  American  agriculture  is  well  acquainted  with  con-
trols  and  the  distorted  effects  of those  controls.  We  cannot  half-
control  an  economy  or quarter-control  an  economy.  We  have  to
totally  control  the  economy.  That  has  not worked  in  the  Soviet
Union.  In  an  economy  as  complex  and  as  free  as  ours  with  the
competing wants  we permit  among  Americans,  it is  impossible  to
construct  a  set  of controls  that  could  more  equitably  and  intelli-
gently allocate  resources and distribute income than a well-ordered
marketplace.
In the  final analysis, whatever  costs may be involved in under-
taking this critical  micro-economic  policy examination  and efforts,
in the long run that cost is much smaller than the cost of permitting
the  economy  to  keep  lurching  along  with  built-in  and  increasing
inflationary  biases.  This  is  not  the way  to  provide  a  measure  of
security  whether for consumers or  wage earners  or businesses.  It
does  not provide  a planning  horizon  that makes  any  sense at all.
Inflation  is a worldwide disease.  It is only going to be countered
by  worldwide  international economic  and financial  cooperation.  In
a world in which we become  increasingly aware of the finiteness of
our resources,  increasing attention will have to be paid to equating
those  demands  which  can  be  reasonably  satisfied  over  a  long
period  of time  with  the  resources  to  satisfy  those demands.  The
unlimited  economic  growth horizon that the world has been pursu-
ing  for  a  long  time  is  fading  into  oblivion.  As  a  consequence  of
increasing  raw  goods  scarcity,  the  economic  costs  of growth,
which have clearly been demonstrated thus far to be very high,  are
going to be even higher  in the future.  The world is going to have to
sit down and say,  how on earth are  we going to grow,  and grow  in
such  a way,  that there is something left for posterity both in terms
of real resources  and in terms of a quality  of life that future genera-
tions can  enjoy.
Limited resources  raise  the  question  of the  developed  world's
responsibility  toward  the  underdeveloped  world  in  terms  of re-
source  sharing  and resource  distribution.  Also,  when  the realities
of limited and costly economic  growth  become apparent,  the mat-
ter of income redistribution,  which has so long been ignored in this
country,  is going to  have to  be examined  in a  very serious  way.
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